Abstract-Judging a gymnastics routine is a noisy process, and the performance of judges varies widely. In collaboration with the Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) and Longines, we are designing and implementing an improved statistical engine to analyze the performance of gymnastics judges during and after major competitions like the Olympic Games and the World Championships. The engine, called the Judge Evaluation Program (JEP), has three objectives: (1) provide constructive feedback to judges, executive committees and national federations; (2) assign the best judges to the most important competitions; (3) detect bias and outright cheating.
I. INTRODUCTION
Gymnastic judges and judges from similar sports are susceptible to well-studied biases 1 . [3] detected a national bias of artistic gymnastics judges at the 1984 Olympic Games: judges tend to give better marks to athletes from their home country while penalizing close competitors from other countries. National bias was subsequently detected in rhythmic gymnastics at the 2000 Olympic Games [4] , and in numerous other sports such as figure skating [5] , [6] , Muay Thai boxing [7] , ski jumping [6] , diving [8] and dressage [9] .
[10] observed a serial position bias in gymnastics experiments: a competitor performing and evaluated last gets better marks than when performing first. [11] found a conformity bias in gymnastics: open feedback causes judges to adapt their marks to those of the other judges of the panel. [12] found a sequential bias in artistic gymnastics at the 2004 Olympic Games: the evaluation of a gymnast is likely more generous than expected if the preceding gymnast performed well. [13] showed in an experiment that still rings judges can make systematic errors based on their viewpoint. Biases observed in other sports might also occur in gymnastics as well. [14] found a reputation bias in figure skating: judges overestimate the performance of athletes with a good reputation. [15] quantified the racial bias of NBA officials against players of the opposite race, which was large enough to affect the outcome of basketball games. Interestingly, the racial bias of NBA officials subsequently disappeared, most probably due to the public awareness of the bias from the first study [16] .
The aforementioned biases are often unconscious and cannot always be entirely eliminated in practice. However, rule changes and monitoring from the Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) as well as increased scrutiny induced by the media exposure of major gymnastics competitions make these biases reasonably small. In fact, judging is much more about skill and training than bias: it is difficult to evaluate every single aspect of the complex movements that are part of a gymnastics routine, and unsurprisingly nearly all international judges are former gymnasts. This challenge has been known since at least the 1930s [17] , and there is a large number of studies on the ability of judges to detect execution mistakes in gymnastic routines [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] 2 . In a nutshell, novice judges consult their scoring sheet much more often than experienced international judges, thus missing execution errors. Furthermore, international judges have superior perceptual anticipation, are better to detect errors in their peripheral vision and, when they are former gymnasts, leverage their own sensorimotor experiences.
Even among well-trained judges at the international level, there are significant differences: some judges are simply better than others. For this reason, the Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) has developed and used the Judge Evaluation Program (JEP) to assess the performance of judges during and after international competitions. The work on JEP was started in 2006 and the tool has grown iteratively since then. Despite its usefulness, the first architecture of JEP was outdated. It was hard to maintain, difficult to use by anyone except its designer, and its conception made it prone to manipulation errors. More importantly, there were undetected design errors and undesirable mathematical behavior, and it was sometimes adjusted by parties with conflicting viewpoints. Hence, it was not always evaluating what it ought to evaluate.
A. Our contributions
In collaboration with the FIG 3 and Longines 4 , we are currently redesigning and rewriting JEP. The new version, henceforth named NEW-JEP, is a full software stack that handles all the interactions with the databases, and includes a statistical engine as well as a user-friendly front-end to generate statistics, recommendations and judging reports. The main objective of NEW-JEP is to assess, as objectively as possible, the performance of international gymnastics judges. This assessment provides feedback to judges, executive committees and national federations. It is helpful, for instance, to evaluate how to train and accredit judges, and to propose corrective measures for judges performing below expectations. It will be used to reward the best judges by selecting them to the most important competitions such as the Olympic Games. It can also provide hints about inconsistencies and confusing items in the Codes of Points detailing how to evaluate each apparatus. In uncommon but important circumstances, NEW-JEP can also uncover biased and cheating judges.
This article focuses on the core statistical engine of NEW-JEP and describes how it evaluates judges. Our main objective is to put judge evaluations on a stronger mathematical footing using simple yet rigorous tools. We want the software, once properly trained, to be usable by Longines and the FIG during an entire 4-year Olympic cycle without input from a mathematician or a statistician.
The main tool we develop is a marking score evaluating the accuracy of the marks given by a judge. We design the marking score such that it is unbiased with the apparatus/discipline under evaluation, and unbiased with respect to the skill level of the gymnasts. In other words, the main difficulty we overcome is as follows: a parallel bars judge giving 5.3 to a gymnast deserving 5.0 must be evaluated more generously than a vault judge giving 9.9 to a gymnast deserving 9.6, but how much more? To quantify this, we model the behavior of judges as heteroscedastic random variables using data from international and continental gymnastics competitions held during the 2013-2016 Olympic cycle. The standard deviation of these random variables decreases as the performance of the gymnasts improves, which allows us to quantify precisely how judges compare to their peers. To the best of our knowledge, this dependence between judging variability and performance quality has never been properly studied in any setting (sport or other).
Besides allowing us to distinguish between accurate and erratic judges, we also use the marking score as the basic tool to detect outlier evaluations. We designed NEW-JEP so that the more accurate is a judge, the lower is his/her outlier detection threshold. 3 www. fig-gymnastics .com 4 www.longines.com
The previous iteration of JEP used a ranking score to evaluate whether judges ranked gymnasts in the correct order. We analyzed different metrics to compare distances between rankings such as the generalized version of Kendall's τ distance [23] . Depending on how these rankings scores are parametrized, they are either unfair by penalizing unlucky judges who blink at the wrong time, or correlated with our marking score and thus unnecessary. Since no ranking score achieved the objectives of the FIG, NEW-JEP no longer includes a ranking score.
We made other interesting observations that led to recommendations and changes at the FIG during the course of this work. We show that reference judges, hand-picked by the FIG and imparted with more power than regular panel judges, are not better than these regular panel judges in the aggregate. We thus recommended that the FIG stops granting more power to reference judges. We also show that women judges are significantly more accurate than men judges in artistic gymnastics and in trampoline, which has training and evaluation implications. This is the first of a series of three articles on sports judging. In the second article [24] , we refine national bias studies in gymnastics using the heteroscedastic behavior of the judging error of gymnastics judges. In the third article [25] , we show that this heteroscedastic judging error appears with a similar shape in other sports where panels of judges evaluate athletes objectively within a finite marking range.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We present our dataset and discuss the gymnastic judging system in Section II. We derive the marking score in Section III. In Section IV, we use the marking score to detect outliers. Section V discusses ranking scores and why we ultimately left them aside. We present interesting observations and discoveries in Section VI and conclude in Section VII by discussing the strengths and limitations of NEW-JEP.
II. DATA AND JUDGING SYSTEMS
Gymnasts at the international level are evaluated by panels of judges for the difficulty, execution, and artistry components of their performances. The marks given by the judges are aggregated to generate the final scores and rankings of the gymnasts. The number of judges for each component and the aggregation method are specific to each discipline. In this article, we analyze the execution component of all the gymnastics disciplines: artistic gymnastics, acrobatic gymnastics, aerobic gymnastics, rhythmic gymnastics, and trampoline. We also evaluate artistry judges in acrobatic and aerobic gymnastics, but exclude difficulty judges from our analysis. Our dataset encompasses 21 international and continental competitions held during the 2013-2016 Olympic cycle culminating with the 2016 Rio Olympic Games.
The execution of a gymnastics routine is evaluated by a panel of judges. typical execution panel for each discipline 5 . With the exception of trampoline, these panels include execution and reference judges. Execution and reference judges have different power and are selected differently, but they all judge the execution of the routines under the same conditions and using the same criteria.
After the completion of a routine, each execution panel judge evaluates the performance by giving it a score between 0 and 10. Table I includes the number of performances and judging marks per discipline in our dataset. The number of performances in an event is not always equal to the number of gymnasts. For instance, gymnasts who wish to qualify for the vault apparatus finals jump twice, each jump counting as a distinct performance in our analysis. The number of judging marks depends on the number of performances and the size of the judging panels.
The execution evaluation of a gymnastics routine is based on deductions precisely defined in the Code of Points of each apparatus. The 2017-2020 Codes of Points, their appendices and other documents related to rules for all the gymnastics disciplines are publicly available on the FIG website 6 . The score of each judge can thus be compared to a theoretical control score corresponding to the "true" performance of the gymnast. The FIG typically derives control scores with outside judging panels and video review post-competition, but does not provide accurate control scores for every performance. The number of control scores and how they are obtained depends on the discipline and competition. Control scores were unavailable for our analysis, thus we trained NEW-JEP using the median panel mark of each performance as the control score, which is a good approximation of the true performance level. Whenever reference judges are present, we include them with execution panel judges and take the median mark over this enlarged panel. We discuss the implications of training our data with the median, and control scores in general, in Section VII.
III. MARKING SCORE
We now derive a marking score to evaluate the performance of gymnastics judges. We first describe our general approach using artistic gymnastics data in Section III-A and present results for the other gymnastics disciplines in Section III-B. Table II summarizes the notation we use in this section. 5 The execution panels do not always follow this typical composition: the qualifying phases in artistic and rhythmic gymnastics may include four execution judges instead of five, World Cup events and continental championships do not always feature reference judges, and aerobic and acrobatic gymnastics competitions can have larger execution panels. 6 Competitions in our dataset were ruled by the 2013-2016 Codes of Points. 
A. General approach applied to artistic gymnastics
The marking score must have the following properties. First, it must not depend on the skill level of the gymnasts evaluated: a judge should not be penalized nor advantaged if he judges an Olympic final with the world's best 8 gymnasts as opposed to a preliminary round with 200 gymnasts. Second, it must allow judges comparisons across apparatus, disciplines, and competitions. The marking score of a judge is thus based on three parameters:
1) The control scores of the performances 2) The marks given by the judge 3) The apparatus / discipline Let s p,j be the mark for Performance p given by Judge j. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the random variable e p,j s p,j − c p for artistic gymnastics, corresponding to the difference between the judge mark and the control score of the performance. For simplicity purposes, we call this difference e p,j the judging error of Judge j for Performance p, even when we approximate the control score by the median. Our first observation is that the judging error is unbiased, thus the judges are too severe as often as they are too generous. This is trivially true because we use the median as control score. The second observation is that the judging error is highly heteroscedastic. Judges are much more accurate for the best performances, and simply using e p,j underweights errors made for the best gymnasts.
Figures 2 and 3 respectively show the sample variance and the sample standard deviation of the judging error as a function of the control score c p for artistic gymnastics. The sample variance decreases almost linearly with the control score, except for the best performances for which it does not converge to zero. The curve in Figure 3 is an exponential weighted least-squares regression of the data. By inspection this is an outstanding fit, and the outliers correspond to the rare gymnasts that aborted or catastrophically missed their routine. The weighted root-mean-square deviation (RMSD) of the regression is 0.015, which is almost one order of magnitude smaller than the smallest deduction allowed by a judge. We use this exponential equation for our estimator of the standard deviation of the judging errorσ d (c p ).
We can do the same analysis at the apparatus level. For example, Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively show the weighted least-squares regressions for still rings, uneven bars, women's floor exercise and men's floor exercise.
More generally, the estimator forσ d (c p ) depends on the discipline (or apparatus) d under evaluation and the control score c p of the performance, and is given bŷ
For some apparatus like men's floor exercise in Figure 7 the exponential regression is linear within the data range. For apparatus such as women's floor exercise in Figure 6 , there is no performance with a mark close to 10 in the dataset, and the best fitted curves go to zero before 10. We use max(·, 0.05) as a fail-safe mechanism should some gymnasts get much larger marks than expected in the future. We emphasize that all the disciplines and apparatus we analyzed have highly accurate regressions: besides acrobatic gymnastics, for which we do not have as much data, the worst weighted root-mean-square deviation is RMSD ≈ 0.04. The marking score of Performance p by Judge j is
It expresses the judging error as a function of the standard deviation for a specific discipline and control score. The overall marking score for Judge j is given by
The marking score of a perfect judge is 0, and a judge whose judging error is always equal toσ d (c p ) has a marking score of 1.0. The mean squared error weights outliers heavily, which is desirable for evaluating judges. Figure 8 shows the boxplots of the marking scores for all the judges for each apparatus in artistic gymnastics using the regression from Figure 3 . The acronyms are defined in Table III . The first observation is that there are significant differences between apparatus. Pommel horse, for instance, is intrinsically more difficult to judge accurately than vault and floor exercise. The FIG confirms that the alternative, i. e., that judges in pommel horse are less competent than judges in men's vault or men's floor exercise, is highly unlikely. The differences between floor and vault on one side and pommel horse on the other side were previously observed in punctual competitions [26] , [27] , [28] . Note that the better accuracy of vault judges does not make it easier to rank the gymnasts since many gymnasts execute the same jumps at a similar performance level. (149) W_UB (119) M_PB (158) M_HB (153) M_FX (156) W_BB (117) W_FX (115) M_VT (153) W_VT (119) Marking score Figure 8 : Distribution of the overall marking scores per artistic gymnastic apparatus using one overall formula. The acronyms are defined in Table III , and the numbers between brackets are the number of judges per apparatus in the dataset. A highly desirable feature for the marking score is to be comparable between apparatus and disciplines, which proves difficult with one overall formula. The differences between apparatus make it challenging for the FIG to qualitatively assess how good the judges are and to convey this information unambiguously to the interested parties. We thus estimated the standard deviationσ d (c p ) for each apparatus (instead of grouping them together) and used the resulting regressions to recalculate the marking scores. The results, presented in Figure 9 , now show a good uniformity and make it simple to compare judges from different apparatus with each other. A pommel horse judge with a marking score of 1.0 is average, and so is a vault judge with the same marking score. This has allowed us to define a single set of quantitative to qualitative thresholds applicable across all the gymnastics apparatus and disciplines. (153) M_SR (149) W_UB (119) M_PB (158) M_HB (153) M_FX (156) W_BB (117) W_FX (115) M_VT (153) W_VT (119) Marking score Figure 9 : Distribution of the overall marking scores per artistic gymnastic apparatus using an individual formula per apparatus. The acronyms are defined in Table III , and the numbers between brackets are the number of judges per apparatus in the dataset.
B. Other gymnastic disciplines
We use the same approach for the other gymnastics disciplines. Figures 10, 11 and 12 respectively show the weighted least-squares regressions for rhythmic gymnastics, acrobatic gymnastics and aerobic gymnastics. We do not discuss the results at the apparatus level, although we found notable differences: group routines in rhythmic gymnastics are more difficult to judge than individual ones, and groups in acrobatic gymnastics are more difficult to judge than pairs. We also analyzed the artistry judges in acrobatic and aerobic gymnastics, and were surprised to observe that the heteroscedasticity of their judging error was almost the same as for execution judges.
Trampoline, shown in Figure 13 , was the most puzzling discipline to tackle. The behavior on the left side of the plot is due to gymnasts that aborted their routine before completing all their jumps, for instance by losing balance and landing a jump outside the center of the trampoline. We solved the problem by fitting the curves based on the completed routines. The result is shown in Figure 14 , with aborted routines represented with rings instead of filled circles. Again, the weighted RMSD is excellent.
When calculating the marking score for trampoline judges, the marks of gymnasts that did not complete their exercise may or may not be taken into account by NEW-JEP. If they are accounted for, the estimator generously evaluates judges when gymnasts do not complete their routine, which results in a slightly improved overall marking score. The behavior observed in trampoline appears in other sports with aborted routines or low scores [25] and can be modeled with Control score Standard deviation of judging error concave parabola. This, however, decreases the accuracy of the regression for the best performances, which is undesirable.
Trampoline exhibits the largest differences between apparatus: tumbling is much more difficult to judge than individual trampoline, which in turn is much more difficult to judge than double mini-trampoline. The boxplots per trampoline apparatus in Figure 15 clearly illustrate this (the acronyms are defined in Table IV ). NEW-JEP thus uses a different regression equation per apparatus. Finally, note that Figure 14 excludes data from synchronized trampoline because its judging panels are partitioned in two halves, each monitoring a different gymnast. The subpanels (two judges each) are too small to derive accurate control scores, and for this reason NEW-JEP does not currently support synchronized trampoline.
IV. OUTLIER DETECTION
The old iteration of JEP included a rudimentary tool that flagged judges suspected of national bias. In NEW-JEP, we use the marking score to signal (performance, judge) outlier pairs, that is, judging marks that are unreasonably high or (11) IND (20) DMT (11) Marking score Figure 15 : Distribution of the overall marking scores per trampoline apparatus using one overall formula. The acronyms are defined in Table IV , and the numbers between brackets are the number of judges per apparatus in the dataset.
unreasonably low, with an increased emphasis on outliers from the same nationality. These suspicious evaluations usually lead to video reviews of the relevant routines post-competition, and in egregious circumstances may result in sanctions by the FIG Disciplinary Commission. Figure 16 , like Figure 1 , shows the judging errors for artistic gymnastics judges. Differences of more than two standard deviations (2 ·σ d (c p )) away from the control score are marked in red 7 . The problem with this approach is that a bad judge has a lot of outliers, and a great judge none. This is not what the FIG wants, because an erratic judge can be unbiased and a precise judge can be biased and dishonest.
Instead of using the same standard deviation for all the judges, we scale the standard deviation by the overall marking score of each judge, and flag the judging scores that satisfy
We use max(·, 0.1) to ensure that a difference of 0.1 from the control score is never an outlier. The results are shown in Figure 17 . Eq. (4) flags ≈ 5% of the marks, which is slightly more than what would be expected for a normal distribution. The advantage of the chosen approach is that it compares each judge to herself/himself, that is, it is more stringent for precise judges than for erratic judges. The disadvantage of the chosen approach is that one might think that a judge without outliers is good, which is false. The marking score and outlier detection work in tandem: a judge with a bad marking score is erratic, thus bad no matter how many outliers it has. The FIG can have a close look at outliers, even for precise judges with good marking scores. Note that we present a comprehensive analysis of national bias in gymnastics in the second article of this series [24] .
V. RANKING SCORE
The ranking of the gymnasts is determined by their scores, which are themselves aggregated from the marks given by the judges. The old iteration of JEP used a ranking score to evaluate to what extent judges ranked the best athletes in the right order. In a vacuum this makes sense: the FIG wants to select the most deserving gymnasts for the finals, and award the medals in the correct order. In this section we show that providing an objective assessment of the judges based on the order in which they rank the best athletes is problematic, and we recommended that the FIG stops using this approach.
. . , g n } be a set of n gymnasts. A ranking on G is a sequence r = a 1 a 2 a 3 . . . a n , a i = a j ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} of all the elements of X that defines a weak order on X. Alternatively, a ranking can be noted as r = (r g1 , r g2 , r g3 , . . . ) , where r g1 is the rank of Gymnast g 1 , r g2 is the rank of Gymnast g 2 , and so on. The mathematical comparison of rankings is closely related to the analysis of voting systems and has a long and rich history dating back to the work of Ramon Llull in the 13th century. Two popular metrics on the set of weak orders are Kendall's τ distance [29] and Spearman's footrule [30] , both of which are within a constant fraction of each other [31] . In recent years, [23] generalized these two metrics by taking into account element weights, position weights, and element similarities. Their motivation was to find the ranking minimizing the distance to a set of search results from different search engines.
Definition 5.2: Let r be a ranking of n competitors. Let w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) be a vector of element weights. Let δ = (δ 1 , . . . , δ n ) be a vector of position swap costs where δ 1 1 and δ i is the cost of swapping elements at positions i − 1 and
We define the mean cost of interchanging positions i and r i byp(i) = pi−pr i i−ri . Finally, let D : {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , n} be a non-empty metric and interpret D(i, j) = D ij as the cost of swapping elements i and j. The generalized Kendall's τ distance [23] is
Note that K * is the distance between r and the identity ranking id = (1, 2, 3 , . . . ). To calculate the distance between two rankings r 1 and r 2 , we calculate
, where (r 2 ) −1 is the right inverse of r 2 . These generalizations are natural for evaluating gymnastics judges: swapping the gold and silver medalists should be evaluated more harshly than inverting the ninth and tenth best gymnasts, but swapping the gold and silver medalists when their marks are 9.7 and 9.6 should be evaluated more leniently than if their marks are 9.7 and 8.7.
To test the relevance of ranking scores as a measurement of judging performance, we ran several simulations to compare them to our marking score. As an example for this article, we use the men's floor exercise finals at the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. We first calculate the control scores c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c 8 of the eight finalists from the marks given by the seven execution judges (five panel judges and two reference judges). We then simulate the performance of 1000 average judges j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 1000} by randomly creating, for each of them, eight marks s 1,j , s 2,j , . . . , s 8,j for the eight finalists using a normal distribution with mean c p and standard deviation σ d (c p ) for p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}. We then calculate, for each judge, the marking score as well as three ranking scores based on Eq. (5) with the three different sets of parameters from Table V . Figure 18 : Ranking score vs marking score for 1000 synthetic average judges and the first set of ranking score parameters from Table V . We aggregate the points on the x-axis to improve visibility. Figure 19 : Ranking score vs marking score for 1000 synthetic average judges and the second set of ranking score parameters from Table V . We aggregate the points to improve visibility. Table V . We aggregate the points to improve visibility. Figures 18, 19 and 20 show the ranking score with respect to the marking score of the 1000 judges for the three parameter sets. The figures illustrate that the correlation between the ranking score and the marking score varies widely depending on the chosen parameters.
The parameters used in Figure 18 are those of the original version of Kendall's τ distance [29] . This simply counts the number of bubble sort swaps required to transform one ranking into the other; swapping the first and second gymnasts separated by 0.1 point is equivalent to swapping the seventh and eighth gymnasts separated by 1.0 point. In Figure 19 , the element swap costs vary (D ij = |c i − c j |). This decreases the penalty of swaps as the marks get closer to each other; in particular, swapping two gymnasts with the same control score c i = c j incurs no penalty. This increases the correlation between the marking score and the ranking score, and both, to some extent, measure the same thing. In Figure 20 , we also vary the position swap costs (δ i = 1 i ). This increases the importance of having the correct order as we move towards the gold medalist. The correlation between the marking score and the ranking score decreases, thus we penalize good but unlucky judges that make mistakes at the wrong place, and reward erratic but lucky judges.
It is unclear how to parametrize the ranking score; it is either redundant with the marking score, or too uncorrelated to be of any practical value. The marking score already achieves our objectives. It is based on the theoretical performances of the gymnasts and reflects bias and cheating, as this involves changing the marks up or down for some of the performances. Furthermore, the FIG insists that a theoretical judge who ranks all the gymnasts in the correct order but is either always too generous or too strict is not a good judge because he/she does not apply the Codes of Points properly. From these observations, we decided to build NEW-JEP without a ranking score.
VI. OBSERVATIONS, DISCOVERIES AND

RECOMMENDATIONS
During the course of this work we made interesting and sometimes surprising observations and discoveries that led to recommendations to the FIG. We summarize our observations about reference judges in Section VI-A and judging gender discrepancies in Section VI-B.
A. Reference judges
All the gymnastic disciplines except trampoline have reference judges. In artistic and rhythmic gymnastics 8 , the execution score is first calculated with the trimmed mean of the middle three of out five execution panel judges. This score is then compared to the reference score consisting of the mean score of the two reference judges. If the gap between the execution panel score and the reference score exceeds a predefined tolerance, and if the difference between the marks of both reference judges is below another threshold, then the final score of the gymnast is the mean of the execution panel and reference scores. This makes reference judges dangerously powerful. At each competition, execution judges are randomly selected from a set of accredited judges submitted by the national federations. In contrast, reference judges are hand-picked by the FIG, and the additional power granted to them is based on the assumption that execution judges are sometimes incompetent or biased. To test this assumption, we compared the marking scores of the execution panel and reference judges. The results for artistic gymnastics are shown in Figure 21 9 . Although this is obvious by inspection, a two-sided Welch's t-test returned a p-value of 0.18 and we could not reject the null-hypothesis that both means are equal.
We ran similar tests for the other gymnastics disciplines, and in all instances reference judges are either statistically indistinguishable from the execution panel judges, or worse. Having additional judges selected by the FIG is an excellent idea because it increases the size of the panels, thus making them more robust. However, we strongly recommended that the FIG does not grant more power to reference judges. They are not better, and the small size of the reference panels further increases the likelihood that the errors they make have greater consequences. The FIG Technical Coordinator has recently proposed the adoption of our recommendation.
B. Gender discrepancies: women are more accurate judges than men
In artistic gymnastics, men apparatus are almost exclusively evaluated by men judges and women apparatus are almost exclusively evaluated by women judges. Figure 8 , besides showing the differences between apparatus, also shows that the marking scores for women apparatus are lower than those of men apparatus. Figure 23 formalizes this observation by 9 In Figure 21 , judges have at least one marking score per apparatus for which they evaluated gymnasts. A judge has two marking scores on a single apparatus when appearing on the regular execution panel and on the reference panel for different events. directly comparing the marking scores of men and women judges in artistic gymnastics 10 . The average woman evaluation is ≈ 15% better than the average man evaluation. More formally, we ran a one-sided Welch's t-test with the null-hypothesis that the mean of the marking scores of men is smaller than or equal to the mean marking score of women. We obtained a p-value of 10 −15 at the 95% confidence level, thus leading to the rejection of the null-hypothesis.
Two hypotheses can explain this difference in artistic gymnastics: women gymnasts are easier to evaluate than men, and/or women judges are better than men. The FIG originally thought that the women Codes of Points were more difficult to apply, which does not seem to be the case from the analysis. Furthermore, we can observe from Figure 8 that judges for women's vault are better than judges for men's vault, and that judges for women's floor exercise are better than judges for men's floor exercise. This can hardly be explained by the differences in the Codes of Points or the intrinsic nature of the apparatus.
A more probable important cause is that in artistic gymnastics, men routines include ten elements, whereas women routines include eight elements. Furthermore, the formation and accreditation process is different for men and women judges. Men, who must judge six apparatus, receive less training than women, who must only judge four. Some men judges also have a (maybe unjustified) reputation of laissezfaire, which contrasts with the precision required from women judges.
In order to obtain more insight, we compared women and men judges in trampoline, which has mixed judging panels as well as the same accreditation process and apparatus per gender. The difference between gender observed in artistic gymnastics is less pronounced but remains in trampoline: women are more accurate judges than men.
We suspect that an important contributor of this judging gender discrepancy in gymnastics is the larger pool of women Women (20) Marking score Figure 23 : Distribution of marking scores per gender in trampoline.
practicing the sport, which increases the likelihood of having more good women judges at the top of the pyramid since nearly all judges are former gymnasts from different levels. As an illustration, a 2007 Survey from USA Gymnastics reported four times more women gymnasts than men gymnasts in the USA [32] . A 2004 report from the ministère de la Jeunesse, des Sports et de la Vie Associative reported a similar ratio in France [33] . Accurate information on participation per gender is difficult to come by, but fragmentary results indicate a similar participation gender imbalance in trampoline [34] .
On a different note, we did not observe any mixed-gender bias in trampoline, i.e., judges are not biased in favor of samegender athletes. This in opposition to other sports such as handball where gender bias by referees led to transgressive behaviors [35] .
In light of our gender analysis, we recommended that the FIG and its technical committees thoroughly review their processes to select, train and evaluate men judges in artistic gymnastics and trampoline. The marking score implemented in NEW-JEP will provide valuable help in this task.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
We put the evaluation of international gymnastics judges on a strong mathematical footing using robust yet simple tools. This has led to a better assessment of current judges, and will improve judging in the future. It is clear that there are significant differences between the best and the worst judges; this in itself is not surprising, but we can now quantify this much more precisely than in the past.
Our main contribution is a marking score that evaluates the accuracy of the marks given by judges. The marking score can be used across disciplines, apparatus and competitions. Its calculation is based on the sample standard deviation, estimated from prior data, of the difference between the marks given by judges and the theoretical control scores of the gymnasts. It can and should be calibrated at the beginning of every Olympic cycle with data from the previous cycle. The FIG can use the marking score to assign the best judges to the most important competitions. The marking score is also the central piece of our outlier detection technique highlighting evaluations far above or below what is expected from each judge. The marking score and outlier detection work in tandem: the more accurate a judge is in the long-term, the harder it is for that judge to cheat without being caught due to a low outlier threshold detection.
The FIG classifies international gymnastics judges in four categories: Category 1, 2, 3 and 4. Only judges with a Category 1 brevet can be assigned to major international competitions. The classification is based on theoretical and practical examinations, with increasingly stringent thresholds for the higher categories. As an example, in men's artistic gymnastics [36] the theoretical examination for the execution component consists in the evaluation of 30 routines, 5 per apparatus. NEW-JEP tracks judges longitudinally in real conditions over thousands of evaluations and as such is much more accurate than the FIG examinations. Our dataset is dominated by Category 1 judges, and even at that level NEW-JEP shows significant differences among judges.
A. Marking score limitations
The first limitation of the marking score is that judges are compared with each other and not based on their objective performance. An apparatus with only outstanding judges will trivially have half of them with a marking score below the median, and the same is true of an apparatus with only atrocious judges. From discussions with the FIG, no apparatus or discipline has the luxury of having only outstanding judges. We therefore proposed our qualitative thresholds based on the fact that most judges are good, and a reward-based approach for the very best ones.
The second limitation of the marking score is its dependence on accurate control scores. While it is appropriate to rely on the median to train the model and assess the long-term accuracy of judges when more accurate control scores are unavailable, relying on the median for a single performance or a small event such as an Olympic final can be misleading. A high marking score for a specific performance is not necessarily an indicator of a judging error but can also mean that the judge is accurate but out of consensus. The FIG typically relies on observers like outside panels and superior juries to obtain quick feedback during competitions. We do not report detailed results here, but our analysis shows that like for reference judges, these observers are in the aggregate equal or worse than regular panel judges, and giving them additional power is dangerous. Discrepancies between this outside panel and the regular panel should be viewed with circumspection. The best the FIG can do in this circumstance is to add these outside marks to the regular panel to increase its robustness until a more accurate control score is available post-competition.
The Technical Committee (TC) of each discipline calculates control scores post-competition using video reviews. Each TC uses a different number of members, ranging from two to seven, to evaluate each performance. Furthermore, each TC uses a different aggregation technique: sometimes members verbally agree on a score and other times they take the average. Even with video review, the FIG cannot guarantee the accuracy and unbiasedness of the TC members. We therefore suggested clear guidelines for the calculation of the control scores post-competition to make them as robust as possible. This is paramount to guarantee the accuracy of JEP on a per routine and per competition basis.
